Determining Evaluation Voting
I have invented some hybrid of voting and evaluation method. Three ore more alternatives are evaluated on some kind of scale by different voters/evaluators. A quite advanced method is then used to elect one alternative. My method does not only use the order alternatives are ranked. The exact positions voters place alternatives on a scale are used to elect one alternative.
Her is a Java script tool to simulates how this method works Voting Simulation (Is tested with Mozilla Firefox 3.6.17 and Internet explorer 8)
In fact one part of the voting algorithm is quite easy. Evaluation values are just summarized for alternatives and the alternative with greatest sum wins. What’s more complicated is that values of alternatives before summarizing are multiplied by different factors for different voters. Those factors are calculated to weight in desired amount consensus and minimize tactics bad for common.
A number I cal consensus-exponent defines the priority between consensus and majority decision. With a high consensus-exponent the priority will be to elect decisions valued high by many. With low consensus exponent priority instead will be to define and favour a large united group.
Different Tactics also will have different advantages with different consensus-exponent. High consensus-exponent favours evaluating alternatives probably far from being elected high but not low. With low consensus exponent not valuing alternatives far from being elected high, even if you like them, will be a more successful tactic.
What tactics that might work anyway depends very much upon what voters know about other voters voting. Not only witch alternatives that probably will be elected matters. To benefit from tactics with my method you also need to know how voters evaluating some alternatives in a specific way, evaluates other alternatives.
Manny people think tactics bad for common would bee a large problem with a method evaluating alternatives instead of just ranking them. In my system for determining evaluation voting, setting or setting not high or low values in the edge of the voters scale doesn’t much affect influence between other alternatives, if those alternatives are far from being elected. There is no way to eliminate all tactics, but voting is a collective action and voting will just become meaningful if other voters think and vote in the same way. If tactics become to ineffective and risky then loyalty against all voters together would overtake loyalty to “cheat” in favour of our own group.
Benefits with Determining Evaluation Voting:
1. The method should bee much better then ranking methods to make god compromises that benefit everyone as much an equal as possible in a group. That’s because indata is voters evaluation with desired distance between alternatives.
2. The method can bee used to take decisions with all desired amount of consensus.
3. Indata to the method could also with advantage bee all possible alternatives in several joint questions. For example, to decide how delegation shall be used in a voting system you can vote about what kind of delegation that shall be used for different questions. For example if no delegation, direct delegation or even indirect delegation shall be used for ordinary questions, budget questions and/or constitutional questions. You can also in that example vote on how to determine such classification of questions etc. All that can be done in one joint question. A joint question with all feasible combinations of alternatives in it’s containing questions as alternative. A joint question that’s not visible for voters but in which voters evaluation of the questions it contains are summarized and given the joint questions alternatives for each voter.
The great advantage with such arrangement is that voters have the opportunity to concentrate their influence on (sub-) questions that they know well and/or have a large opinion of. Better compromises would than be made.